

~~TOP SECRET~~

VENONA

From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 921, 922, and 924

M - 154
Furnished only
to Mr. Hyde (CIA)

16 June 1943

To VIKTOR[i].

Your number 2143[ji]

"ZAYaTs" [iii] has handed over material on [5 groups unrecovered] by a responsible official of the "IZBA" [iv] on 7 June. The contents are as follows:

[1 group unidentified] revolution in RIO[v]

[13 groups unrecovered]

5 June. On 6 June the junta dissolved congress, suppressed the communist newspaper "LA HORA," and prohibited meetings of any political organizations attended by more than three persons. [1 group unidentified], that

[48 groups unrecoverable]

views that do not differ from the conservative policy of CASTILLO's government. CASTILLO's overthrow was accomplished by the joint efforts of two groups which recognized the necessity of avoiding a popular uprising: 1) General RAMIREZ's group, which wished to [3 groups unrecovered] and foreign policy of CASTILLO [3 groups unrecovered] that

[14 groups unrecoverable]

RAWSON [4 groups unrecovered]

Part 2] CASTILLO's conservative internal policy

[62 groups unrecovered]

of military equipment from "STRANA" [vi]

[11 groups unrecovered]

RAWSON

[22 groups unrecovered]

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ARMOUR in charge of the work of organization. [4 groups unrecovered] which had been proclaimed was scared off by the simultaneous

[17 groups unrecoverable]

and at the head of the government was General RAMIREZ. The latter's position remains unclear, as he has not got a firm base for running the country. In view of the ease with which the preceding government was overthrown, in the near future it is possible that [2 groups unrecovered] popular uprising. SECOND. Telegrams from ARMOUR, ambassador of the "STRANA" [vi] to the "BANK" [vii]. 1) In a series of [1 group unidentified] telegrams ARMOUR optimistic [sic] that the situation in RIO [v] [5 groups unrecovered] 2) On 2 June he reported what "a certain radical representative" gave him on the first of June concerning preparations for a revolution. ARMOUR concluded that the official [1 group unrecovered] by RAMIREZ of rumors concerning preparations for a revolution represented an attempt to conceal the [publication??] of plans. 3) On 4 June ARMOUR [2 groups unrecovered] "revolutionary movement" organized by RAMIREZ,

[39 groups unrecovered]

ARMOUR visited Captain Karlos MARTINEZ, whom ARMOUR "knew well," and transmitted a personal letter from RAWSON indicating that the "revolutionary movement," although [2 groups unrecovered] armed forces, will follow "democratic principles."

[Part 3] 5) In his next telegram, of 4 June, ARMOUR indicated that he [6 groups unrecovered] (information from "ZAYaTs" his report to the "BANK" [vii] was also confused, as was [

[43 groups unrecoverable]

measure[,] this prevents the "STRANA" [vi] from recognizing the new government in RIO [v]. One of the important motives of the leaders of the revolt was an effort to get arms, which they can get in their opinion only by breaking relations with the Axis. 8) In the last telegram, of 6 June, ARMOUR reported that events were developing very unfavorably. 9) On 7 June A. [5 groups unrecovered]

[15 groups unrecoverable]
[25 groups unrecovered]

Comments:

- [i] Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.
- [ii] Not available.
- [iii] ZAYaTs: i.e., "HARE" or "STOWAWAY"; Maurice HALPERIN.
- [iv] IZBA: Office of Strategic Services.
- [v] RIO: BUENOS AIRES.
- [vi] STRANA: i.e., the "COUNTRY"; the United States.